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Note
Employer Defamation: Reasons and Remedies for
Declining References and Chilled Communications

in the Workplace
by
DEBORAH DANILOFF*

In recent years, employer defamation has become a subject of legal
debate.I Newspaper and journal articles express concern over the growing number and expanding scope of defamation suits involving employee
termination. 2 The articles contend that defamation is providing an
*

B.A., University of California, Irvine 1986; Member, Third Year Class.
1. See R. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION 1-6 (1986):
America has developed a new fascination with defamation. More suits are brought
and American juries, the legal system's most reliable barometer of changing attitudes, have on the whole proved extremely sympathetic to plaintiffs both in terms of
propensity to decide in their favor and in the size of damage awards. These changes,
which have been monitored by the Libel Defense Center, indicate that the law of
defamation will probably remain an area of substantial litigation activity.
See also Duffy, Defamation and Employer Privilege, 9 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 444, 444 (1984)
("[T]he employee rights explosion of the last several years has fostered new sensitivity and
focused new attention on such traditional torts as defamation for remedying work-place complaints."); Note, Potential Employer Liability for Employee References, 21 U. RICH. L. REV.
427 (1987) (authored by Kyle E. Skopic); Employers Face Upsurge in Suits over Defamation,
Nat'l L.J., May 4, 1987, at 1 [hereinafter Employers Face Upsurge]; FiredEmployees Turn the
Reason for Dismissal into Legal Weapon, Wall St. J., Oct. 2, 1986, at 33, col. 3 [hereinafter
Fired Employees]; Annotation, Defamation: Loss of Employer's Qualified Privilege to Publish
Employee's Work Record or Qualifications,24 A.L.R. 4th 144 (1983).
The RESTATEME4T (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977) sets forth the elements of defamation as follows:
To create liability for defamation there must be:
(a) a false and defamatory statement concerning another;
(b) an unprivileged publication to a third party;
(c) fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the publisher; and
(d) either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm or the
existence of special harm caused by the publication.
See Stuempges v. Parke Davis & Co., 297 N.W.2d 252, 255 (Minn. 1980) (elements of common-law defamation are that the statement made must (1) be communicated to someone other
than plaintiff, (2) be false, and (3) tend to injure the plaintiff's reputation).
2. See Note, supra note 1, at 427; Employers Face Upsurge, supra note 1, at 1; Fired
Employees, supra note 1, at 33.
[687]
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alarmingly popular vehicle for disgruntled employees to obtain retribu-3
tion from former employers when employment relations deteriorate.
Recent expansions in defamation law, such as the recognition of self4
publication defamation actions, undoubtedly have fueled this trend.
The increasing use of defamation in employment disputes raises two
central concerns: the demise of the employer referral system and the
inhibition of communications in the workplace. For instance, because of
the recent popularity of defamation suits, many employers now refuse to
give references 5 and attorneys are advising their employer clientele that
3. See Note, supra note 1, at 427; Employers Face Upsurge, supra note 1, at 1; Fired
Employees, supra note 1, at 33.
4. Defamation requires an unprivileged publication of a false statement to a party other
than the plaintiff. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577 (1977).
Generally, there is no publication when the defendant communicates the statement only
to the plaintiff. Id.; see Shoemaker v. Friedberg, 80 Cal. App. 2d 911, 916, 183 P.2d 318, 322
(1947) (when defamed person voluntarily discloses the contents of a libelous communication to
others, the originator of the libel is not responsible); see also Merritt v. Detroit Memorial
Hosp., 81 Mich. App. 279, 284-86, 265 N.W.2d 124, 126-27 (1978) (defendant is not liable if
plaintiff repeats statement to third party when defendant communicates statement only to
plaintiff or when the plaintiff voluntarily repeats the statement to another).
A few defamation suits, however, have prevailed without publication by the defendant.
This exception, referred to as self-publication defamation, typically arises when a third party
forces the plaintiff to communicate the defamatory statement. See, e.g., McKinney v. County
of Santa Clara, 110 Cal. App. 3d 787, 795-97, 168 Cal. Rptr. 89, 93-94 (1980) (defamation
action valid when discharged deputy sheriff was under strong compulsion to reveal false termination reason to prospective employer); Colonial Stores Inc. v. Barrett, 73 Ga. App. 839, 84041, 38 S.E.2d 306, 308 (1946) (defamation action valid when employer wrote defamatory reason for termination on wartime certificate of availability with knowledge that employee would
have to show the certificate to prospective employers); Grist v. Upjohn Co., 16 Mich. App.
452, 484-86, 168 N.W.2d 389, 405-06 (1969) (defamation action valid when employer gave
false reason for termination with knowledge that defamatory statement would be revealed to
prospective employers); Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 389 N.W.2d 876, 888 (Minn.
1986) (Minnesota Supreme Court recognized self-publication defamation when employees
were compelled to repeat false reason for termination to prospective employers).
5. See McLanahan, The Mechanics for Handling Employee Terminations: Releases,
Post-Employment Proceedings and Related Problems, 208 PRACTICING L. INST. ON LITIGATION & ADMIN. PRAC. SERIES 131, 153 (1982) (suggesting precautions before employee discharge); New Twist to Defamation Suits, A.B.A. J., May 1, 1987, at 17 (Defense lawyer
Douglas Williams of Ohio states: "Before the Equitable case, our clients-which included
both Fortune 500 corporations and small businesses-were more willing to tell the circumstances of an employee's departure, be they good or bad. Now they are more inclined to just
tell the callers the employee's job title and the amount of time they worked there."); Note,
supra note 1, at 427 ("[T]he increasing propensity of individuals and companies to sue over
undesirable or inadequate references has made many employers reluctant to give out frank and
detailed references.") (citing Stuempges v. Parke Davis & Co., 297 N.W.2d 252 (Minn. 1980);
Lewis, 361 N.W.2d 875 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 389 N.W.2d 876
(Minn. 1986)); Comment, Speak No Evil: The Minnesota Supreme Court Adopts Self-Publication Defamation: Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States, 71 MINN. L.
REV. 1092, 1112-13 (1987) (authored by S. Olivia Mastry) ("[T]he existence of self-publication
defamation may cause companies to create a policy of never giving information, good or bad,
about employees.") (emphasis in original); Employers Face Upsurge, supra note 1, at 30-31
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silence is the best policy regarding termination. 6 This policy predictably
harms both employers and employees by restricting job mobility and by
inhibiting optimal relocation of employees. Limited information about
potential employees increases the possibility of an employer hiring less
qualified applicants. The demise of the referral system also may undermine a more qualified employee's job prospect because an employer is
more likely to hire an applicant with, rather than without, a reference,
regardless of relative qualifications. An inadequate referral system also
may increase employer liability for negligent hiring because of the increased risk of unknowingly hiring incompetent employees without refer-

ences. 7 Finally, the threat of liability for self-publication defamation may

undercut employee morale and job security since employers may find
themselves compelled to terminate employees without stating their
reasons. 8
The rising number of employer defamation lawsuits also threatens
open and efficient communication in the workplace. Apart from silence

upon discharge, fear of liability (especially for self-publication defamation) may chill communication in other areas of workplace discourse,
leaving both employers and employees at a disadvantage. Potential liability may impede the completion of progress reports and evaluations,
and inhibit other day-to-day exchanges of information. For instance, a
false or inaccurate progress report or evaluation conceivably could provide a basis for a self-publication defamation suit in a termination situa("Statistics show that employers are giving out less information. A recent survey by a Chicago-based outplacement consulting firm found that prospective employers did not check the
references of nearly 75 percent of their job candidates. 'Most employers are not attempting to
check a candidate's references because the former employers are not expected to cooperate...
[t]he reasons,... have to do with the possibility of potential litigation.'. . . Most lawyers are
telling employers that they should give out only the dates of employment and the positions
held when asked for a reference. . . . '[T]he safest thing is to say nothing about anybody.' ")
(quoting Mr. Challenger, president of Challenger, Gray and Christmas Inc. and Mr. McDonald, attorney at Chicago's Keeck, Mahin & Cate); FiredEmployees, supra note 1, at 33, col. 3
("'[Employer defamation] suits are the new workhorse in termination litigation.' . . . The
trend is prompting many companies to refrain from making any negative statements about
former employees.") (quoting Rodney Smolla, Professor of Law at University of Arkansas).
6. Employers Face Upsurge, supra note 1, at 30.
7. The essence of the negligent hiring claim is an employer's failure to ascertain deficiencies in the employee's background or character that pose a potential threat of harm to clientele. See, e.g., Kendall v. Gore Properties, Inc., 236 F.2d 673, 677-78 (D.C. Cir. 1956)
(employer landlord held liable in wrongful death action for murder of tenant committed by
employee janitor); Stewart Warner Corp. v. Burns Int'l Sec. Serv., Inc., 353 F. Supp. 1387,
1391-92 (N.D. Il1. 1973) (employer held liable for fire set by security guard).
8. Summers, ProtectingAll Employees Against Unjust Dismissal, 58 HARV. Bus. REV.
132, 133 (1980); Note, ProtectingAt Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to
Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1816, 1835-36 (1980); Comment, supra note
5, at 1113 (citing The Committee on Labor and Employment Law, Ass'n of the Bar of the City
of New York, At- Will Employment and the Problem of Unjust Dismissal, 208 PRACTICING L.
INST. ON LITIGATION & ADMIN. PRAC. SERIES 174-76 (1982)).
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tion since the employee could argue that he was compelled to reveal the
information to an interested third party. Although this argument
stretches the self-publication holdings, fear of potential liability in this
situation could adversely affect open communications and, in turn, inhibit efficiency and optimal job performance.
In the face of these concerns, this Note explores alternative remedies
for resolving employment defamation disputes. Resolution of the defamation problem necessarily involves a balancing of two interests: employers' free speech rights and protections under constitutional and tort
law and employees' needs for adequate tort remedies when legitimately
defamed. 9 The fear and censorship fostered by the increasing number of
employer defamation suits indicates that the balance between employer
and employee interests has been upset. The time has come to re-evaluate
the current protections afforded employers in light of legitimate employee defamation concerns.
Specific problem areas that are germane to the employment situation include: eroded constitutional principles regarding free speech protection for private individuals;' ° nonuniformity, ambiguity, and overall
inefficiency regarding traditional employer privileges;"I inadequate dam9. See PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 804-05 (W. Keeton 5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter
KEETON] (reviewing the attempt at common law to balance the competing values of free
speech and reputation); see also Ingber, Rethinking Intangible Injuries: A Focus on Remedies,
73 CALIF. L. REV. 772, 822 (1985) ("Whatever is added to the field of defamation or privacy is
taken from the field of free debate. First amendment evaluations normally create a tension
between public safety and free expression-both socially important values.").
10. Some authorities believe that the Supreme Court has decreased first amendment protection in private figure cases after Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472
U.S. 749 (1984). For example, in his dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan stated that Justices
Powell and White "have cut away the protective mantle of Gertz" by allowing the jury to
award presumed and punitive damages absent a showing of malice. Id. at 781 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); see also R. SMOLLA, supra note 1, at 3-11 to 3-14 (asserting that the most logical
reading of Dun & Bradstreet is that the door is open for states to return to a strict liability
standard in private figure cases not involving defamatory speech relating to matters of public
concern); Note, Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.: "Matters of Private Concern" Give Libel Defendants Lowered First Amendment Protection, 35 CATH. U.L. REV. 883,
886 (1986) (authored by Patricia Thompson-Hill) (Dun & Bradstreet reduced protection for
private defamation defendants by making the content of the speech and the status of the plaintiff determinative of first amendment protection); Note, Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss
Builders, Inc.: The Supreme Court FurtherMuddies the Defamation Waters, 20 Loy. L.A.L.
REV. 209, 209-10 (1986) (authored by Laura Saaden) (Dun & Bradstreet "retreat[s] even further, leaving.., individuals defamed by speech not involving a matter of public concern firmly
entrenched in the common law bog.").
11. See Bezanson, Libel Law and the Realities of Litigation: Setting the Record Straight,
71 IOWA L. REV. 226, 227 (1985) (privileges actually "encourage plaintiffs to sue for libel and
provide an ironic ... sanctuary for frivolous claims"); Watkins & Schwartz, Gertz and the
Common Law of Defamation: Of Fault,Nonmedia Defendants, and the ConditionalPrivileges,
15 TEX. TECH L. REV. 823, 884-85 (1984) (A system based solely on due care is preferable to
the conditional privileges "if only on the theory that any step toward simplification is welcome
in this peculiarly complex corner of the law."); Note, Master's Defamation of His Servant, 18
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age and
remedy alternatives; 12 and jury bias in favor of defamation plain3
tiffs.1 This Note addresses how each of the above issues adversely affects
the employer defamation crisis. Changes in, or alternative interpretations of the law for each of the listed problem areas then are proposed
with the goal of reducing the fear that currently inhibits open communication in the workplace.
Section I of the Note begins by examining the historical development of defamation law and recommends adopting the Gertz liability
rule' 4 in employer defamation suits. Historically, private defamation
suits were based on strict liability. Adoption of the Gertz liability rule,
however, would reduce the harshness of common-law defamation by
making proof of negligence a prerequisite to liability in employer defamation suits. This approach narrowly tailors employer defamation actions
to fulfill the state interest in compensating the injured plaintiff while minimizing restrictions on free expression.
Section II then contrasts the ordinary tort definition of negligence
with Professor Anderson's "enhanced or constitutional" definition of
negligence.15 Analysis and comparison of the two definitions of negligence reveal that Professor Anderson's constitutional definition provides
the more effective model for resolving employment defamation cases.
Anderson's proposal changes the ordinary tort definition of negligence in
337-39 (1969) (authored by Charles A. Caruso) (suggesting that lack
of uniformity in application of the conditional privilege rules makes the privilege system cumbersome and antiquated).
12. See Ingber, supra note 9, at 824-32 (contending that general or inferred damages in
defamation cases create risk of fraud and abuse due to the inadequacy of jury guidelines to
determine damages); see also Barrett, DeclaratoryJudgmentsfor Libel: A Better Alternative,74
CALIF. L. REV. 847 (1986) (advocating elimination of punitive damages and legislative adoption of declaratory relief in defamation cases); Franklin, A DeclaratoryJudgment Alternative to
CurrentLibel Law, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 809 (1986) [hereinafter Franklin, Declaratory Judgment] (same).
13. See Franklin, Good Names andBad Law: A Critique of Libel Law and a Proposal, 18
U.S.F. L. REv. 1, 7 (1983) [hereinafter Franklin, Good Names]; Ingber, supra note 9, at 80305, 830 (juries usually are sympathetic to the defamation plaintiff) (citing 2 F. HARPER & F.
JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 15.5, at 892-95 (1956); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF TORTS § 37, at 208 (4th ed. 1971)); Note, ChangingRules of Liability in Automobile Accident Litigation, 3 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 476, 477 (1936) (authored by Richard F. Nixon);
see also R. SMOLLA, supra note 1, at 1-6 (commenting on the propensity of juries to sympathize with and decide in favor of the defamation plaintiff).
14. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974). Throughout the remainder of
the Note, the phrase "'Gertzliability rule" refers to the United States Supreme Court's holding
that the first amendment requires the private plaintiff to demonstrate some degree of fault to
establish liability for a defamation claim.
15. Anderson, Libel and PressSelf Censorship, 53 TEX. L. REV. 422 (1975). References
to a constitutional definition of negligence, an enhanced definition of negligence, and the enhanced or constitutional negligence standard are derived from Anderson's proposal for a new
definition of negligence in media defamation suits. See infra section II(C) for an analysis of
Anderson's proposal.
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 332,
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media defamation suits to a professional negligence standard, and enhances the procedural requirements regarding the burden of proof and
appellate review. Use of this proposal in the employment setting provides more thorough protections for employer speech, thereby reducing
self-censorship created by the application of both strict liability and ordinary tort negligence in private defamation actions.
Section III analyzes the inefficiencies of the conditional privilege
system, which protects employers' speech, and suggests replacing the
privilege mechanisms with the Anderson model. This substitution would
have a three-fold effect. First, the enhanced negligence model would
unify and simplify employer defamation law by both eliminating the multiple definitions of malice required to show abuse of the employer's privilege and clarifying the nature and scope of the employer's protection.
Second, it would reduce the employee's burden of proving malice, which
is necessary to overcome the employer's privilege. Finally, while the
model reduces the employee's burden, the professional negligence requirement and enhanced procedural safeguards reinforce some employer
protections. This section concludes that replacing the antiquated system
of privileges with the Anderson proposal provides the optimal balance
between employer and employee interests.
Having explored the liability aspects of defamation, this Note then
approaches the employer defamation problem from a damage perspective. Section IV highlights the inadequacies of present defamation remedies, and proposes the elimination of punitive damages and the adoption
of a declaratory relief alternative.
This Note concludes that an adequate solution to the defamation
trend will require a complete reconstruction of employer defamation law.
Application of a negligence requirement similar to the Anderson model,
elimination of the conditional privilege system, and reconstruction of defamation remedies are the optimal alterations needed to overhaul defamation law and remedy chilled communications in the workplace.
I.

First Amendment Protection for Employers

For years, legal scholars have debated the appropriate level of free
speech protection afforded the private individual under the first amendment.' 6 The Supreme Court's latest word on the issue, Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 17 failed to clarify whether the
higher first amendment standards of liability set forth in Gertz v. Robert
16. Compare sources cited supra note 10 (lamenting the erosion of constitutional protections for private speech after Dun & Bradstreet) with sources cited infra note 61 (predicting the
demise of strict liability and the inevitability of greater protections in private defamation
actions).
17. 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
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Welch, Inc. "Iapplied to actions against nonmedia defendants.1 9 Despite
the ambiguity of the Supreme Court decisions, a compelling argument
can be made that the first amendment requires application of the Gertz

liability rule, which would repeal strict liability and inject an element of
fault in employer defamation suits. Before exploring this proposal, this
section examines the Supreme Court decisions defining the boundaries of
the first amendment.
A.

Historical Development of Defamation Law

Emphasizing the importance of protecting the individual's reputation, common-law defamation was based on strict liability.20 Under the
common-law system, states virtually had unlimited discretion over the
application of the strict liability standard to defamation actions. 2' Yet,
while the protection of individual reputation represented an important
state interest, countervailing considerations regarding the dissemination
of information prompted the establishment of privilege protections 22 and
the affirmative defense of truth 23 under the common law.
These minimal safeguards, however, provided little protection to the
free flow of ideas. Concern that a free society could not function effectively without a greater degree of tolerance for mistakes in the dissemination of information and ideas thus took on constitutional dimensions,
eroding the states' broad discretion over defamation actions. 24 New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan 25 initiated the Supreme Court's constriction of
state defamation laws. The Sullivan decision established three important

principles: (1) actual malice must be shown to establish liability in a
defamation suit against a public official; 26 (2) fault must be established by

18. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
19. See Comment, Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss: Cuttingaway the ProtectiveMantle
of Gertz, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 1171, 1195 (1986) (authored by Michael Greene) (The "Greenmoss decision takes defamation back into uncertainty, not forward into settled law.").
20. The common law maintained that a defendant published at his own risk. KEETON,
supra note 9, at 804.
21. Id. at 805.
22. See infra notes 112-23 and accompanying text for a discussion of the privileges.
23. See KEETON, supra note 9, at 804. After the plaintiff established the elements of
defamation, the burden shifted to the defendant to prove the truth of the statement. See, e.g.,
Owens v. Scott Publishing Co., 46 Wash. 2d 666, 673, 284 P.2d 296, 302 (1955), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 968 (1956); Carey v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 19 Wash. 2d 655, 659, 143 P.2d 857,
860 (1943).
24. KEETON, supra note 9, at 805.
25. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
26. Id. at 272-83. In the Sullivan case, City Commissioner Sullivan filed a libel suit
against the New York Times Company for false statements referring to the plaintiff's participation in the suppression of civil rights demonstrations. The Court held that libel suits against
public officials require proof of actual malice to establish liability. Id. at 279-80. The Court
based its decision on the need to protect debate on public controversies which in turn promotes
social and political changes. Id. at 279. Without first amendment protection for commentary

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 40

clear and convincing evidence; 2 7 and (3) the defamation judgment is sub28
ject to independent appellate review.
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. 29 was another watershed for the
subordination of state defamation laws to first amendment concerns. Rosenbloom expanded the Sullivan protections to statements involving issues of public or general interest. 30 A plurality of the Court held that the
actual malice standard, which was applied to public officials in Sullivan,
protected any speech relating to an issue of public interest, regardless of
31
the speaker's status.
Three years later, however, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,32 the
Court limited the application of the Rosenbloom rule in private figure
cases. Gertz held that the state interest in protecting the private individual's reputation outweighed first amendment protections of private
speech. 33 The Court reasoned that private individuals are more vulnerable to defamation injury than public figures,3 4 as well as more deserving
of recovery. 35 Thus, private plaintiffs were not required to prove the
more exacting actual malice standard to establish liability. 36 Gertz, however, did create a threshold constitutional requirement for a private defamation action: the plaintiff must furnish proof of fault (whether
negligence or some other degree of fault) to establish liability in all defamation cases. 37 This requirement effectively repealed the common-law
on public officials the "threat of damage suits would 'otherwise inhibit the fearless, vigorous
and effective administration of policies of government.' " Id. at 282 (quoting Barr v. Matteo,
360 U.S. 564, 571 (1959)).
27. Id. at 285-86. The Sullivan Court held that the first amendment "demands" a "constitutional standard" of proof. Id. at 286. The opinion is not clear whether this standard of
proof is required under all first amendment issues or whether the higher standard of proof is
tied to the actual malice requirement. See id. at 285-86.
28. Id. at 284-85. When "the line between speech unconditionally guaranteed and speech
which may legitimately be regulated" is questioned, the Court condoned an independent review of the entire trial record to determine if the decision comported with the principles of the
first amendment. Id. (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525 (1958)).
29. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
30. Id. at 41-45.
31. Id. at 44.
32. 418 U.S. 323, 346 (1974).
33. Id. at 346-47.
34. Id. at 344 (Private individuals are more vulnerable to injury from defamation because
public officials have greater access to channels of communication to counteract false
statements.).
35. Id. (Private individuals are more deserving than public figures because public figures
assume the risk of public criticism by voluntarily placing themselves at the forefront of public
controversy.).
36. See supra text accompanying note 26.
37. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347.
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strict liability element of defamation.3 8 The Gertz decision also abolished
39
presumed and punitive damages absent a showing of actual malice.
A number of years after Gertz, in Dun & Bradstreet,Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,40 the Supreme Court examined whether the Gertz
requirement of actual malice to obtain presumed or punitive damages
applied to a private plaintiff suing a nonmedia defendant. In Dun &
Bradstreeta private plaintiff sued a credit reporting agency for distributing a false report that the plaintiff had filed bankruptcy. Affirming the
lower court decision, the Supreme Court held that the Gertz damage rule,
prohibiting awards of presumed or punitive damages absent a showing of
actual malice, did not apply to nonmedia defendants, such as the
agency. 41 The Dun & BradstreetCourt resurrected the Rosenbloom standard for determining damages in private figure cases by holding that the
Gertz actual malice requirement for presumed damages only attached to
speech of public or general interest. 42 This holding was based on the
Court's view that the Constitution guarantees greater protection for
speech relating to matters of public or general interest, while "[s]peech
on matters of purely private concern is of less First Amendment concern. ' 4 3 The Court determined that the defamatory credit report issued
by the defendant was not a matter of public interest, and thus the Gertz
actual malice standard was not required for proof of presumed or punitive damages. 44
B.

Application of the Gertz Liability Rule in Employer Defamation Cases

The preceding sketch of Supreme Court holdings leaves unanswered
an important question. That is, whether the Gertz liability rule, which
requires a showing of fault, applies to private plaintiffs suing nonmedia
defendants. The following section of the Note sets forth reasons why the
Gertz liability rule can and should be maintained in employer defamation
actions after Dun & Bradstreet. These reasons include: (1) the need to
adopt an interpretation of Dun & Bradstreet that is consistent with the
Gertz liability standard; (2) the current acceptance of the Gertz liability
test in private defamation actions by states and legal scholars; and (3) the
policy reasons underlying first amendment protection which require a
showing of fault.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id.
Id. at 349.
472 U.S. 749, 760-61 (1985).
Id. at 761.
Id.
Id. at 759.
Id. at 761.
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(1) Reconciling Gertz and Dun & Bradstreet

There are several possible interpretations of the status of the Gertz
liability rule after Dun & Bradstreet. One interpretation limits the Gertz
fault requirement to media defendants. Indeed, the aftermath of Gertz

resulted in considerable debate over the validity of basing first amendment protection on media status. 45 Justice Powell, however, implicitly
rejected this view in Dun & Bradstreet when he stated that the Gertz

protections " 'were not justified solely by references to the interest of the
press and broadcast media in immunity from liability.' "46 Justice Powell's rejection of the media-nonmedia distinction is supported by Justice
White's concurrence in Dun & Bradstreet,47 and by Justice Brennan who

in dissent stated that "such a distinction is irreconcilable with fundamen' '48
tal First Amendment principle[s].
A second interpretation of the Supreme Court decisions suggests
that the public concern standard adopted by the Dun & Bradstreet Court
applies to both the liability and damage requirements established in
Gertz. In other words, since Dun & Bradstreet limited the Gertz actual

malice requirement for damages to statements of public concern, the
Gertz fault requirement also should be limited by the public concern

standard. According to this interpretation, the Court reaffirmed a state's
ability to apply strict liability in private defamation cases that involve

49
statements outside the public's concern.
If this interpretation is accurate, its application requires defining
what constitutes a general or public issue. The Gertz opinion, however,
expressly rejected this standard as ambiguous, stating that "[t]he 'public
or general interest' test for determining the applicability of the New York
Times standard to private defamation actions inadequately serves both of

45. See generally Christie, Injury to Reputation and the Constitution: Confusion Amid
Conflicting Approaches, 75 MICH. L. REV. 43, 50 (1976) (analyzing the media-nonmedia distinction); Nimmer, Is Freedom of the Press a Redundancy: What Does It Add to Freedom of
Speech? 26 HASTINGS L.J. 639, 649 (1975) (same); Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away from a General Theory of the First Amendment, 78 Nw. U.L. REV.
1212, 1269 (1983) (same); Smolla, Let the Author Beware: The Rejuvenation of the American
Law of Libel, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 29-33, 90 (1983) [hereinafter Smolla, Author Beware]
(same).
46. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 756 (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323, 343 (1974)).
47. In his concurring opinion, Justice White stated, "Wisely, in my view, Justice Powell
does not rest his application of a different rule here on a distinction drawn between media and
nonmedia defendants. On that issue, I agree with Justice Brennan that the First Amendment
gives no more protection to the press in defamation suits than it does to others exercising their
freedom of speech." Id. at 773 (White, J., concurring).
48. Id. at 781 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S.
765, 777 (1978)). Justice Brennan was joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens.
49. See R. SMOLLA, supra note 1, at 3-12; see also Comment, supra note 19, at 1193
(suggesting that lower courts will likely be free to return to strict liability after Dun &
Bradstreet).
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the competing values at stake." 50 Dun & Bradstreet also demonstrates
the inadequacy of the public interest standard. Justice Powell's opinion
maintained that a credit report is not a matter of general or public interest given the report's "content, form, and context. ' 51 In another context
or form, or given different contents, the report might be a matter of public or general interest. Thus, the public or general interest definition is
infinitely variable. It may cover any type of communication given the
context and circumstances. Under this vague standard, employer speech,
as well as any other private speech, arguably could be a matter of "general interest."' 52 For example, employer referrals may constitute communications of general interest since they promote efficient relocation of
employees and safeguard against employer liability for negligent hiring.
Application of the fault requirement in all defamation cases avoids the
problem of drawing these distinctions.
A final interpretation of Dun & Bradstreet preserves the Gertz liability rule. One reason for preferring this interpretation is that the Dun &
Bradstreet opinion was limited explicitly to an evaluation of the damage
rule established in Gertz. Justice Powell carefully emphasized in the
opening paragraph of his opinion that the Gertz rule concerning presumed and punitive damages was the only issue before the Court.5 3 Justice Brennan's dissent also pointed out that Dun & Bradstreet did not
"question the requirement of Gertz that the respondent must show fault
to obtain a judgment and actual compensatory damages." '54 The Court
held only that the plaintiff must demonstrate actual malice to obtain presumed and punitive damages if the speech relates to matters of general or
public concern. 55 Because the opinion failed to comment on the applicable standard of liability, and because Justice Powell expressly limited the
holding to a determination of the damage requirement, 5 6 the most logical
reading of Dun & Bradstreet is that57 the Gertz fault requirement still
stands in private defamation actions.
Another argument for maintaining the Gertz fault requirement is
that Justice Powell's rejection of the Gertz damage rule (that is, no pre50.
51.
52.
little to
53.

Gertz, 418 U.S. at 346.
Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 762 n.8.
See R. SMOLLA, supra note 1,at 3-14 ("The plurality opinion in Dun & Bradstreetdid
define the phrase 'matters of public concern.' ").
Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 751.

54. Id. at 781 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
55. Id. at 761.
56, Id. at 751.
57. Cf.R. SMOLLA, supra note 1, at 3-12 ("The question of whether the Gertz liability
rules are also swept away in cases not involving matters of public importance remains open.
More specifically, Dun & Bradstreet fails to answer this question conclusively: May a state
impose common law strict liability standards in cases involving private figure plaintiffs and
defamatory speech not involving matters of public concern, or does the Gertz prohibition on
liability without fault continue to apply to all private figure cases?").
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sumed damages absent actual malice) neither logically supports nor compels rejection of the Gertz fault requirement (that is, repeal of strict
liability defamation). Justice Powell based his rejection of the Gertz damage rule on a balancing test. He found that the state interest in protecting individual reputation in private defamation actions, via allowance of
58
presumed damages, outweighed first amendment concerns.
A similar outcome might not be forthcoming, however, if the Gertz
fault requirement were tested under the same standard. The state interest in applying common-law strict liability in private defamation actions
may not be as strong as the state interest in allowing presumed damages.
Injury to reputation frequently will be difficult to quantify and thus almost impossible to prove, 59 whereas proving the existence of negligence
is a routine problem in most tort cases. Absent presumed damages,
many defamation victims would be precluded from recovery since proof
of damage to reputation is vague at best. Absent strict liability, defamation victims will have to demonstrate lack of due care, as do other tort
victims. Therefore, presumed damages provide a greater benefit to defamation victims, and thus could constitute a greater counterbalance to
first amendment concerns than strict liability under the Powell balancing
test. In sum, presumed damages may promote a state interest in compensating defamation victims to a greater extent than strict liability.
Thus, the Powell balancing analysis regarding the need to repeal the
Gertz damage rule in private defamation actions does not imply nor directly support a rejection of the Gertz fault requirement.
(2) Courts and Commentaries Retain the Gertz Liability Rule

General acceptance of the Gertz liability rule further supports its
application in private defamation cases. For instance, many state courts
require at least proof of negligence in all defamation actions. 60 Addition58. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 757.
59. Id. at 760. The rationale of the common-law rules has been the experience and judgment of history that " 'proof of actual damages will be impossible in a great many cases where,
from the character of the defamatory words and the circumstances of publication, it is all but
certain that serious harm has resulted in fact.' " Id. (citing W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF TORTS § 112 (4th ed. 1971)).
60. As of 1984, many states had adopted a negligence standard of liability in private
defamation actions. See Cohen, Libel: State Court Approaches in Developing a Post-Gertz
Standard of Liability, I ANN. SURV. AM. L. 155, 155 (1984) ("No court has sought to impose
liability in a 'Gertz' case on any showing of fault that amounts to less than traditional negligence."); Franklin, What Does "Negligence" Mean in Defamation Cases 6 COMM/ENT L.J.
259, 260 (1983-84) [hereinafter Franklin, Negligence].
Jurisdictions adopting some form of negligence standard in defamation action brought by
a private figure plaintiff include: Alabama (Mead Corp. v. Hicks, 448 So. 2d 308 (Ala. 1983));
Arizona (Peagler v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 114 Ariz. 309, 560 P.2d 1216 (1977)); Arkansas (Little Rock Newspapers, Inc. v. Dodrill, 281 Ark. 25, 660 S.W.2d 933 (1983)); Connecticut (Corbertt v. Register Publishing Co., 33 Conn. Supp. 4, 356 A.2d 472 (Super. Ct. 1975));
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ally, legal authorities have predicted or prescribed a negligence require61
ment in private defamation actions following the Gertz decision.
Delaware (Re v. Gannett, 480 A.2d 662 (Del. Super. Ct. 1984), aff'd, 496 A.2d 553 (Del.
1985)); District of Columbia (Phillips v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 424 A.2d 78 (D.C.
1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 989 (1981)); Florida (Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Ane, 458
So. 2d 239 (Fla. 1984)); Georgia (Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Chumley, 253 Ga. 179, 317
S.E.2d 534 (1984)); Hawaii (Cahill v. Hawaiian Paradise Park Corp., 56 Haw. 522, 543 P.2d
1356 (1975)); Illinois (Troman v. Wood, 62 Ill. 2d 184, 340 N.E.2d 292 (1975)); Kansas
(Gobin v. Globe Publishing Co., 216 Kan. 223, 531 P.2d 76 (1975)); Kentucky (McCall v.
Courier-Journal & Louisville Times Co., 623 S.W.2d 882 (Ky. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S.
975 (1982)); Louisiana (Wilson v. Capital City Press, 315 So. 2d 393 (La. Ct. App. 1975), cert.
denied, 320 So. 2d 203 (La. 1982) (specifically approving decision)); Maryland (General Motors Corp. v. Piskor, 277 Md. 165, 352 A.2d 810 (1976)); Massachusetts (Stone v. Essex
County Newspapers, Inc., 367 Mass. 849, 330 N.E.2d 161 (1975)); Mississippi (Brewer v.
Memphis Publishing Co., 626 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir. 1980) (applying Mississippi law), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 962 (1981)); New Mexico (Marchiondo v. Brown, 98 N.M. 394, 649 P.2d 462
(1982)); Ohio (Thomas H. Maloney &-Sons, Inc. v. E.W. Scripps Co., 43 Ohio App. 2d 105,
334 N.E.2d 494 (1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 883 (1975)); Oklahoma (Martin v. Griffin Television, Inc., 549 P.2d 85 (Okla. 1976)); Oregon (Bank of Ore. v. Independent News, 65 Or. App.
29, 670 P.2d 616 (1983), aff'd, 298 Or. 434, 693 P.2d 35, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 826 (1985));
Pennsylvania (Mathis v. Philadelphia Newspapers, 455 F. Supp. 406 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (applying
Pennsylvania law)); Puerto Rico (Torres-Silva v. El Mundo, 106 P.R. Dec. 415 (1977)); Rhode
Island (DeCarvalho v. daSilva, 414 A.2d 806 (R.I. 1980)); Tennessee (Memphis Publishing
Co. v. Nichols, 569 S.W.2d 412 (Tenn. 1978)); Texas (Foster v. Laredo Newspapers, Inc., 541
S.W.2d 809 (Tex. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1123 (1977)); Utah (Seegmiller v. KSL, Inc.,
626 P.2d 968 (Utah 1981)); Vermont (Colombo v. Times-Argus Ass'n, 135 Vt. 454, 380 A.2d
80 (1977)); Virginia (Gazette, Inc. v. Harris, 229 Va. 1, 325 S.E.2d 713 (1985)); Washington
(Caruso v. Local Union No. 690, 100 Wash. 2d 343, 670 P.2d 240 (1983), cert. denied, 108 S.
Ct. 67 (1987)); West Virginia (Crump v. Beckley Newspapers, Inc., 320 S.E.2d 70 (W. Va.
1983)); Wisconsin (Denny v. Mertz, 106 Wis. 2d 636, 318 N.W.2d 141, cert. denied, 459 U.S.
883 (1982)); Wyoming (Adams v. Frontier Broadcasting Co., 555 P.2d 556 (Wyo. 1976)).
61. Eaton, The American Law of Defamation Through Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and
Beyond: An AnalyticalPrimer,61 VA. L. REV. 1349, 1417 (1975) ("Gertz will almost surely be
applied to defamation suits by private individuals against non-media defendants."); see also id.
at 1418 ("It would seem that retaining strict liability for defamation by individuals has little in
logic or policy to commend it.").
In Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 70 (1971), Justice Harlan stated,
[I]t does no violence ... to the value of freedom of speech... to impose a duty of
reasonable care upon those who would exercise these freedoms. I do not think it can
be gainsaid that the States have a substantial interest in encouraging speakers to
carefully seek the truth before they communicate, as well as in compensating persons
actually harmed by false descriptions of their personal behavior. Additionally, the
burden of acting reasonably in taking action that may produce adverse consequences
for others is one generally placed upon all in our society. Thus, history itself belies
the argument that a speaker must somehow be freed of the ordinary constraints of
acting with reasonable care in order to contribute to the public good ....
Cf KEETON, supra note 9, at 808 (Keeton argues that the Gertz fault standard does not necessarily extend to communications between private individuals, but notes that the "American
Law Institute has predicted that state law will require as a prerequisite to recovery in any case
of defamation a showing of at least negligence with respect to truth or falsity and that such
should be the law."); R. SMOLLA, supra note 1, § 3.01[4] (Dun & Bradstreet is subject to the
interpretation that none of the first amendment fault restrictions of Gertz are operable when
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Finally, the Second Restatement of Torts adopts a definition of defama62
tion that requires negligence to establish liability.
(3) Public Policy Favors Adoption of Gertz Fault Requirements
Policy reasons underlying first amendment protection reinforce the
need for the application of the Gertz liability rule in employer defamation
suits. While first amendment principles generally are associated with
public discourse, 63 the policy reasons that support the protection of public discourse are equally applicable to private speech. In his Dun &
Bradstreet dissent, Justice Brennan correctly pointed out that speech
that is "purely a matter of private discourse ... would fall well within the
range of valuable expression for which the First Amendment demands
protection. ' 64 Justice Brennan's position advocating the protection of
private speech is consistent with the goals underlying the first amendment. These goals or policies include: fostering debate on public or gen65
eral issues to bring about political, economic, and social change;
promoting of optimal decisionmaking; 66 and enhancing personal
67
liberty.
Even if one accepted the notion that public speech merits greater
protection than private speech, private speech is not of such lesser importance as to justify removal of all first amendment protection. Thornhill v.
Alabama 68 exemplifies the idea that both public and private speech can
effect political, economic, and social change. Thornhill held that debates
regarding employee hour, wage, and working conditions were important
parts of public discourse and deserved constitutional protection. 69 The
Court found "force [in] the argument that labor relations are not matters
of mere local or private concern. Free discussion concerning the conditions of industry is indispensable to the effective and intelligent use of
processes of government to shape the destiny of modern industrial
70
society."
Admittedly, Thornhill focused on workplace speech that was of public concern rather than strictly private speech between employers and
the plaintiff is a private figure and the statement does not concern matters of public interest. If
we follow this interpretation, states may return to the common-law liability standards regarding private individuals. There is danger in this interpretation.).
62. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977). For the text of § 558, see
supra note 1.
63. See supra text accompanying note 43.
64. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 791 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
65. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95 (1940).
66. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
67. Shiffrin, supra note 45, at 1239-40.
68. 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
69. Id. at 102-03.
70. Id. at 103.
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employees regarding termination and referrals. The Thornhill opinion,
however, suggests that daily economic and social discussion, including
debate in the workplace, contributes to political and economic decisionmaking that may have repercussions on others within the community. In
addition, such debate may shape and develop national policies.
A second policy reason to expand first amendment protection to private speech is that optimal decisionmaking depends on the free exchange
of ideas. 7 1 That is, free exchange of information regarding employee performance promotes efficiency in the workplace and optimal relocation of
employees. For instance, freeing employers from the fear of unwarranted, excessive liability promotes better relationships between employers and employees. Employers will give accurate, uninhibited
evaluations to their present employees, which will help the employees
decide whether to improve their job performance to meet their employer's expectations and demands, or to seek employment with a more
compatible employer.
Additionally, free expression of ideas, regardless of its effects on optimal decisionmaking, is valuable in and of itself because it contributes to
a healthy, pleasant work environment. 72 The ability to express opinions
without fear of liability promotes a sense73of self-fulfillment and individuality that also improves work relations.
In sum, greater first amendment protection for employer speech
promotes the social policy of efficient and optimal decisionmaking in the
workplace. Also, private speech in general is valuable as an extension of
personal identity and liberty. Removal of all constitutional protection of
private speech and the resurrection of common-law strict liability in private figure cases defeats both policies. At the very least, the promotion of
these two goals deserves a safeguard against the unnecessarily chilling
effect of strict liability-the adoption of the Gertz liability rule in employer defamation cases.
A final policy reason for adopting the Gertz liability rule is the lack
of a constitutional basis for distinguishing between public and private
speech. Since the literal language of the first amendment fails to differen71. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
("[T]he ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of
truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market.").
72. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (freedom
of speech is valued as both a means and an end), overruled by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444 (1969).
73. See Shiffrin, supra note 45, at 1239 ("As long as speech represents the freely-chosen
expression of the speaker while depending for its power on the free acceptance of the listener,

freedom of speech represents a charter of liberty from noncoercive action.") (citing Baker,
Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IowA L. REV. 1, 7 (1976))
(emphasis deleted).
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tiate the types of speech that fall within its protection, 74 why should the
employer be denied the minimal protection provided by the Gertz liability rule? "The language of the First Amendment does not except speech
directed at private economic decisionmaking. Certainly such speech
'7 5
could not be regarded as less important than political expression.
"[T]he First Amendment requires significant protection from defamation
law's chill for a range of expression far broader than simply speech about
'76
pure political issues."

Recognition of the Gertz liability rule is the first step toward resolving the employer defamation problem. Adopting this aspect of the Gertz
holding would encourage employers to use reasonable care in their
speech, and to protect themselves by keeping accurate records and conducting thorough investigations. Employers would gain a uniform level
of protection that insures against liability absent negligence or some
greater degree of fault. Finally, foreclosing common-law strict liability
would inhibit the success of some defamation suits. This, in turn, would
alleviate the fear generated by increasing employer liability and free up
workplace communications.
II.

An Enhanced Definition of Negligence

A. Ordinary Negligence Standard
Many states accept negligence as a standard of liability for private
defamation suits. 77 Although requiring proof of negligence is a barrier to

recovery, it does not appear to provide enough protection to curb the
detrimental trend of litigation that threatens both the employer referral
system and open communication in the workplace. Employer defamation suits continue to escalate 78 despite general acceptance of a negligence standard of liability. Thus, ordinary tort negligence may not be an
adequate safeguard of employer speech.
B.

Actual Malice Standard

Requiring actual malice or gross irresponsibility to establish liability
in private defamation actions is one solution to the inadequacy of an ordinary negligence requirement. In fact, a few states already have adopted
these more exacting standards. 79 While adopting an actual malice or
74. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech ....").
75. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Grove, 404 U.S. 898, 905 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari).
76. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. 472 U.S. 749, 777 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
77. See supra note 60.
78. See sources cited supra note 1.
79. States using the actual malice test for private figure cases involving speech of public
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gross irresponsibility standard would enhance employer protections, the
excess burden on defamed employees is unwarranted. The employer who
fails to use due care in his speech, who is in fact at fault when he injures
the employee's reputation, will not be liable unless the employee can
demonstrate the higher standard of fault. When the employee clearly
establishes lack of due care by the employer, and is denied recovery due
to either the actual malice or gross irresponsibility standard, the employee's injury subsidizes the employer's free speech fights. Furthermore, when lack of due care is tolerated in the employer's speech, the
goal of maintaining an efficient and healthy work environment is not
advanced.
C. Anderson's Enhanced Negligence Standard for Media Defendants
Professor Anderson's proposal for a constitutional or enhanced negligence standard in media cases80 provides a useful model for negligence
in the employment situation. Anderson's proposal lies between the ordinary tort negligence and the stringent actual malice standards of fault
discussed above. Anderson's enhanced negligence standard requires the
media defendant to act in accordance with the standards espoused by the
professional community rather than the ordinary person. 8 ' Anderson
contends that the flexible and sometimes arbitrary nature of ordinary tort
negligence is inadequate when public policy supports greater protection
of free expression. He asserts that while ordinary tort negligence represents a very flexible mechanism for obtaining judgments, "negligence
under Gertz serves an entirely different purpose-the preservation of a
minimum area of 'breathing space' for the press-which it attempts to
accomplish by freeing publishers and broadcasters from liability for innocent misstatements. '8 2 Anderson suggests that ordinary negligence is inadequate to prevent unnecessary self-censorship because "[n]o one with
the slightest appreciation for the myriad uncertainties of common law
or general interest include: Alaska (Gay v. Williams, 486 F. Supp. 12 (D. Alaska 1979) (applying Alaska law)); Colorado (Diversified Management, Inc. v. Denver Post, Inc., 653 P.2d
1103 (Colo. 1982)); Indiana (Aafco Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. Northwest Publications, Inc., 162 Ind. App. 671, 321 N.E.2d 580 (1974), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976));
Michigan (Dienes v. Associated Newspapers, Inc., 137 Mich. App. 272, 358 N.W.2d 562
(1984)).
New York applies a gross irresponsibility standard, which is defined as acting without due
consideration for the standards of information gathering and dissemination ordinarily followed
by responsible parties. New York Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc., 38 N.Y.2d
196, 199, 341 N.E.2d 569, 571, 379 N.Y.S.2d 61, 64 (1975).
80. Anderson, supra note 15, at 422. See generally Franklin, Negligence, supra note 60, at
259 (explaining Anderson's view and expanding on the meaning of a constitutional definition
of negligence in defamation cases against media defendants).
81. Anderson, supra note 15, at 466.
82. Id. at 460.
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negligence would rely on the belief that reasonable care will preclude an
83
adverse verdict."
Anderson also proposes applying the Sullivan clear and convincing
evidence test to establish the professional negligence requirement. 84 Because New York Times Co. v. Sullivan established an actual malice standard in conjunction with the clear and convincing evidence test for
defamation cases involving public officials, 85 commentators 86 and one
court 87 maintain that the higher burden of proof is linked to the actual
malice standard. The Supreme Court, however, has yet to consider the
scope of the convincing clarity requirement. 88 Anderson claims that,
given the vulnerability of the media to defamation actions and the national importance placed on free and open debate in the press, the clear
and convincing evidence test should be applied in private actions against
89
media defendants.
Finally, Anderson supports the use of the Sullivan procedural requirement for independent appellate court review of jury verdicts. 90 He
contends that a common-law application of negligence provides inadequate appellate review since appellate courts typically do not overturn
questions of fact. 9 1 Free speech policies are essential in media defamation cases, however, and the appellate court should have greater reviewing power. 92 Independent review would protect against jury verdicts
93
biased against unpopular speech.

D. Applying Anderson's Proposal to Employer Defamation Actions
Although Anderson's proposals focus on media defendants, his arguments provide appropriate remedies for the current employment defamation problem. For instance, a professional negligence standard would
require that the employer "exercise the skill and knowledge normally
exercised by members of his profession."' 94 What is reasonable for the

ordinary person is not always reasonable for the employer in a termina83. Id.
84. Id. at 467-68.
85. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 284-86 (1964); see supra text accompanying notes 26-27.
86. See, e.g., R. SMOLLA, supra note 1, at 3-21; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 580B comment j (1977).
87. Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 597, 350 A.2d 688, 698 (1976).
88. Anderson, supra note 15, at 467-68. But see Pearce v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 664
F. Supp. 1490, 1512 (D.D.C. 1987) (rejecting convincing clarity standard as too burdensome
for private figure plaintiff on issue of falsity).
89. Anderson, supra note 15, at 467-68.
90. Id.; see supra text accompanying note 28.
91. Anderson, supra note 15, at 468.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 467-68.
94. Id. at 466.
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tion situation. Employers face a unique set of contingencies that many
people would not consider in their evaluation of what is reasonable.
Therefore, employer speech should be judged in light of the profession
involved, the standards within that profession, the need for quick or decisive action in termination decisions, the business sense and propriety involved in the employer's speech, and a myriad of other factors that are
unique to the employment situation. To allow juries to decide what is
reasonable based on an ordinary negligence definition imposes a uniform
standard on all defendants that is unrealistic given the variety of professions, circumstances, and resources available to different employers. A
professional negligence standard reassures the employer that she will not
be held liable for actions that are reasonable within the custom and rules
of the particular job. Knowing this, the employer can tailor her speech
to what is reasonable and acceptable in her profession, rather than adopting a no reference or no reason for termination policy.
The fact that constitutional aspects of defamation are incompatible
with traditional tort law negligence definitions provides another reason
to apply Anderson's proposal for an enhanced definition of negligence in
defamation cases. Anderson asserts that the ordinary tort negligence
standard "is inappropriate, confusing or incomprehensible when applied
to communications torts."' 95 Ordinary tort negligence is purposefully
malleable in order to allow a determination of liability in a variety of fact
situations. Judgments rendered under this standard neither encompass
nor preserve a minimum area of breathing space for first amendment
rights. Under an ordinary negligence standard, an employer who exercises reasonable care in her speech still may justifiably fear liability. First
amendment concerns require more refined standards for determining reasonableness in order to insure that the free exchange of ideas and opinions is not stifled by tort law. The professional negligence standard
allows this type of enhanced critique.
Anderson's second proposal-applying a clear and convincing evidence test-also is appropriate in the employer defamation situation.
The clear and convincing evidence test would increase the plaintiff's burden of proof beyond the current preponderance of the evidence requirement. Clear and convincing evidence is defined as "clear, explicit and
unequivocal" or as "sufficiently strong to command the unhesitating assent of every reasonable mind."'96 The distinction between the two standards has been summarized as follows: "preponderance calls for
probability, while clear and convincing proof demands high
95. Id. at 480.
96. In re Jost, 117 Cal. App. 2d 379, 383, 256 P.2d 71, 74 (1953) (quoting Sheehan v.
Sullivan, 126 Cal. 189, 193, 58 P. 543, 544 (1899)).
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probability."97 Thus, evidence demonstrating a high probability that the
employer acted unreasonably would be necessary to establish liability.
Application of the convincing clarity test would have a positive effect on employer defamation cases by insuring that the plaintiff's claim
has merit. Frivolous defamation suits aimed at increasing settlement
awards most likely will decrease with the application of the higher burden of proof. Additionally, enhanced scrutiny of the evidence under the
clear and convincing test increases the likelihood that the court will in
fact apply the professional negligence standard rather than accepting
vague assertions of due care under the ordinary negligence standard.
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,98 further supports application of
the convincing clarity test when first amendment issues are at stake. The
Rosenbloom plurality noted that an erroneous verdict in an ordinary civil
suit is no more serious for one litigant than it is for another. 99 It recognized, however, that in libel cases "an erroneous verdict for the plaintiff
[is] most serious. Not only does it mulct the defendant for an innocent
misstatement ...

but the possibility of such an error ...

would create a

strong impetus toward self-censorship."' ° In other words, an erroneous
verdict in an ordinary civil suit is not as serious as an erroneous verdict
in a libel suit because the latter tends to chill the free speech of the class
of persons who are situated similarly to the individual defendant. Thus,
the Rosenbloom Court used the higher standard of proof to insure that
juries do not lightly impose liability when such a verdict would tend to
inhibit open discourse. Accordingly, the Court criticized the use of the
preponderance of the evidence standard in defamation actions.10 '
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan also supports the application of the
clear and convincing test.' 0 2 While the Sullivan Court applied the higher
burden of proof in defamation suits involving a public official, the Court
did not specifically limit the clear and convincing test to the public official scenario.10 3 In fact, the reasons for imposing a heavier burden of
proof in a Sullivan defamation suit are equally valid in the private figure
case involving a nonmedia defendant. The employer, like the media defendant in a Sullivan scenario, is more likely to inhibit all potentially
dangerous speech if negligence can be demonstrated easily.'04 The clear
and convincing evidence test precludes the low threshold of proof re97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
tential

B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE § 160, at 137 (3d ed. 1986).

403 U.S. 29 (1971).
Id. at 50.
Id.
Id.
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285-86 (1964).
Id.
See id. at 300, 304 (arguing that if mere strong words about public issues create poliability, public debate will diminish greatly).
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quired under the preponderance of evidence test, thus reducing the po-

tential for the mistaken liability verdicts that chill open communication.
Anderson's third proposal-to require independent appellate review-also is useful in employer defamation cases. Anderson contends
that independent review protects media defendants from jury verdicts biased against unpopular speech.10 5 A similar analysis applies in the employment situation. Independent review counterbalances preconceived
notions that juries may have about employers. Jury sympathy is likely to
lie with the dismissed employee, while the employer is perceived as the
"bad guy."10 6 Given the current employee rights trend, 10 7 such a perception is conceivable. Therefore, review of jury verdicts could provide
some protection against jury bias.
Juries have been considered particularly suited for determining negligence. As a result, appellate courts are hesitant to question a jury's
determination of facts.' 0 8 When constitutional principles are at issue,
however, traditional rules regarding the scope of appellate review are inappropriate. 109 For example, the Sullivan Court held that independent
appellate review was necessary to insure that the reckless disregard stan0 The need for appellate review
dard would be applied constitutionally. 11
is just as compelling in the private defamation scenario because there is a
105. Anderson, supra note 15, at 467-68.
106. See sources cited supra note 13 (describing jury tendency to favor defamation
plaintiffs).
107. For example, at-will employment contracts have come under attack in recent years as
a result of growing awareness and concern for the employee's right to his job. See Editorial,
Employment At-Will: An Idea Whose Time is Done?, 9 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 1, 1-3 (1983);
Strickler, Limitations on Employer's Rights to Discipline and Discharge Employees, 9 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 70, 76 (1983); Note, Employment At- Will: Emerging Protectionsfor the
Employee, 22 WASHBURN L.J. 491, 491-93 (1983) (authored by Gary L. Brawn & M. Kathryn
Webb).
Employee rights also are manifest in equal protection issues through legislative enactments, such as the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, § 701(k), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)
(1978). See Mass, The Pregnancy DiscriminationAct: ProtectingMen from Pregnancy Based
Discrimination,9 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 240 (1983).
The Supreme Court has upheld the right of an employee to refuse to perform hazardous
work by liberally construing the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, § 1 l(c)(1), 29
U.S.C. § 660(c)(1) (1986). Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1 (1980); Allen &
Linenberger, The Employee's Right to Refuse Hazardous Work 9 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 251,
256 (1983).
Experiments with peer review systems have been conducted in order to promote participatory management by employees and utilize an alternative dispute mechanism to resolve
grievances. Coombe, Peer Review: The Emerging Successful Application, 9 EMPLOYEE REL.
L.J. 659, 659-70 (1984).
108. Appellate courts rarely overturn a jury's finding of negligence. See Franklin, Negligence, supra note 60, at 273; see also LDRC Bull. No. 6, May 1982, at 35, 42 (demonstrating
plaintiffs' success on appeal in defamation cases).
109. Anderson, supra note 15, at 468.
110. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 284-85 (1964).
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similar likelihood of an unconstitutional application of the Gertz liability
standard. In fact, negligence may be less easily distinguishable from innocent conduct than recklessness, and thus the greater need for review in
a Gertz scenario." 1
In sum, adopting Anderson's model in the employment field has
several advantages over a simple negligence requirement. The model
tailors the negligence requirement to the type of speech involved by invoking a professional definition of negligence rather than adopting the
ambiguous and malleable due care standard of tort law. A professional
negligence standard protects against broad generalities regarding speech
in the employment setting that would unnecessarily chill open
communication.
The procedural requirements of independent appellate review and
clear and convincing evidence provide added assurance that the employee's claim has merit and that the employer's false statement is unreasonable according to the profession's standards. Independent review
enables appellate courts to reverse decisions that are inconsistent with
the higher constitutional standards, and to scrutinize jury verdicts for
bias, thereby maintaining uniformity and certainty within constitutional
law.
Adoption of Anderson's proposal in the employment setting, however, may be problematic if state qualified privilege rules conflict or overlap with an enhanced negligence requirement. The following section of
this Note examines the inadequacies of the conditional privilege and recommends replacing the present system with the enhanced negligence
standard.
III.

A.

Substituting the Enhanced Negligence Standard for the
Qualified Privilege

The Privilege to Defame

Before analyzing the inadequacies of the privilege system, an overview of the development and scope of privilege rules is in order. Prior to
the advent of first amendment protection, the common law reflected the
idea that, in order to encourage free communication about important
matters, the law must recognize exceptions to strict liability defamation. " 2 The FirstRestatement of Torts justified the idea of a privilege to
defame by observing:
Were such protection not given, true information which should be
given or received would not be communicated through fear of the persons capable of giving it that they would be held liable in an action of
111.
112.

Anderson, supra note 15, at 468.
KEETON, supra note 9, at 824-42.
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defamation unless they could meet the
heavy burden of satisfying a
113
jury that their statements were true.
Today, absolute and qualified privileges protect speech in areas in
which uncensored expression is an important public policy. The absolute
privilege' 14 provides complete immunity based upon the status of the ac.tor.115 The qualified or conditional privilege shields speech when public
policy justifies enhanced protection, but provides protection only as long
116
as the privilege is not abused.
The conditional privilege protects employer's speech. The common
interest doctrine is the public policy that justifies application of the qualified privilege in the employment scenario.1 17 It provides protection when
the employer and the recipient of the employer's speech have a common
interest in the communication. The doctrine generally covers both employer referrals and references and also extends to the self-publication
scenario. 1 8 Thus, the employer loses the protection of the qualified privilege if: (1) he lacks belief or reasonable grounds for belief in the defamatory matter;1 19 (2) there is excessive publication;120 (3) the false statement
is not reasonably necessary to accomplish the purpose for which it was
given; 12 ' or (4) the statement is made with actual malice, 122 or common123
law malice.
Despite these apparently clear rules regarding the qualified privilege,
courts have struggled nonetheless with, defining the boundaries of the
privilege's protections. For example, in Stefania v. McNiff, the employer
posted embarrassing statements about the plaintiff where other employees could see them. 124 The court held that the plaintiff's fellow employ113.

RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS ch. 25, topic 3, scope note (1938).

114. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 585-592A (1977). Absolute privileges include: consent to publication; statements made in judicial or legislative proceedings; statements made by public officials in the performance of their duties; statements between husband
and wife; and statements whose publication is required by law. Id.
115. Id. § 585 introductory note, at 243.
116. Id. at 245.
117. KEETON, supra note 9, at 828-30.
118. Id.
119.

RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS §§ 600-01 (1938). But see RESTATEMENT (SEC-

OND) OF TORTS § 600 (1977). The Second Restatement changes the definition of abuse to
actual malice and adopts the higher standard as a result of the Gertz decision requiring negligence in all defamation cases. Because of the additional element of fault, the second Restatement asserts that negligence is no longer sufficient to amount to an abuse of the conditional
privilege. For an example of a decision that adopts the second Restatement approach, see
infra note 136. See also Watkins & Schwartz, supra note 11, at 881 (discussing the requirements to overcome a conditional privilege in light of Gertz).
120.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 604.

121.

Id. § 605.

122. Id. § 600.
123. See infra note 134 and accompanying text (defining common-law malice).
124. 49 Misc. 2d 480, 481, 267 N.Y.S.2d 854, 855-56 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966).
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ees did not have a legitimate interest in the faults of the plaintiff, and
denied the employer's privilege under the common interest doctrine. 125
Conversely, the court in Combes v. Montgomery Ward held that the employer did not forfeit his privilege when fellow employees of the plaintiff
learned of the false statements through the employer. 126 Similarly, in
Sokolay v. Edlin, the employer retained the qualified privilege when he
verbally accused the plaintiff of illegal acts in front of a part-time custodian. 2 7 The Sokolay court was satisfied that, as an employee on the payroll, the custodian had sufficient interest in the communication to uphold
the privilege.

128

The courts' various interpretations of the scope of the employer's
qualified privilege pursuant to the common interest doctrine demonstrate
its uneven application. Although designed to provide security for employer speech in certain circumstances, the qualified privilege fails to insure consistent and predictable boundaries of protection.
As noted above, an employer loses the protection of the qualified
privilege when the statement is made with actual or common-law malice. 129 A further problem with the qualified privilege system stems from
the multiple definitions of malice used to defeat the privilege. 130 These
multiple definitions include: legal malice or malice implied from any unprivileged statement, 131 common-law malice, which focuses on the defendant's evil state of mind, such as ill will or spite, 132 and actual malice
or knowing or reckless disregard for the truth, as described by the Sulli133
van Court.
In addition to ambiguities created by multiple definitions of malice,
the individual concepts themselves are unclear. For example, the com34
mon-law malice requirements of ill will or spite are vague and relative. 1
125. Id. at 484, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 859.
126. 119 Utah 407, 413, 228 P.2d 272, 276 (1951).
127. 65 N.J. Super. 112, 124, 167 A.2d 211, 218 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1961).
128. Id. at 125, 167 A.2d at 218.
129. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
130. Dean Prosser wrote that the word "malice" has "plagued the law of defamation from
the beginning" and is a "meaningless and quite unsatisfactory term." W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 115, at 794-95 (4th ed. 1971). Professor Eldredge agrees that
"the slipperiness of the word 'malice' in defamation law [prompted] The American Law Institute [to eliminate] it in the first Restatement." L. ELDREDGE, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION
§ 93, at 509 (1978).
131. KEETON, supra note 9, at 833-34. Legal malice merely was a disguised form of strict
liability that is no longer used in modern defamation law. Id.
132. See, e.g., Hardee v. North Carolina Allstate Serv., Inc., 537 F.2d 1255, 1259-60 (4th
Cir. 1976); Arsenault v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 485 F. Supp. 1373, 1379-80 (D. Mass.), aff'd
mem. 636 F.2d 1199 (1st Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 821 (1981).
133. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 600 (1977) (providing an actual malice standard to overcome the conditional privilege).
134. See Note, "Actual Malice" and the Standard of Proofin Defamation Cases in Califor-
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For instance, what degree of spite satisfies the abuse requirement? Dislike? Loathing? The subjective nature of malice also makes it very difficult to prove or disprove. How is a jury to decide whether ill will or spite
existed in the mind of the employer at the time the statement was made
or whether his dislike of an employee was completely unrelated to termination? Additionally, if first amendment policies promote the opportunity for society to choose knowingly among competing ideas, then the
motive of the speaker should not be as important as the falsity of the
statement. 135 Contrary to this policy, the common law emphasizes the
motive aspect of the defamation action.
Finally, there is considerable overlap in the type of malice required
to overcome the qualified privilege and the malice required for punitive
damages. In situations in which a qualified privilege arises and punitive
damages are at issue, there is bound to be confusion over the proper application of the various levels of malice. For instance, the jury may receive two sets of malice instructions, common-law malice to overcome
the privilege and actual malice to establish punitive damages. This unnecessary use of separate requirements undoubtedly works against all
parties by increasing the difficulty, time, and cost of determining the various levels of intent. Additionally, mistakes are more likely to occur, requiring appellate review of trial court malice instructions.
In sum, the privilege system is neither an efficient nor adequate solution to defamation cases. Because it is confusing and complex, the privilege system fails to establish uniform guidelines by which employers can
pattern their activities. The lack of concrete definition makes the privilege system vulnerable to manipulation and abuse. Finally, the system
fails to work efficiently, increasing the time and cost of establishing various level of abuses, and augmenting the probability of mistake.
nia: A Proposalfor a Single ConstitutionalStandard, 16 Sw. U.L. REV. 577, 589 (1986) (authored by Michael B. Farber) (arguing that "'malice' [is] a term of art in defamation law with
multiple and shifting meanings"). The following cases attach varying definitions to the term
"malice," thus demonstrating the inherent vagueness of the term: Quinones v. United States,
492 F.2d 1269, 1275 (3d Cir. 1974) (wrongful act done intentionally without just cause or
excuse); Time, Inc. v. Ragano, 427 F.2d 219, 221 (5th Cir. 1970) (false disregard for the truth);
Goforth v. Avemco Life Ins. Co., 368 F.2d 25, 31 (4th Cir. 1966) (bad faith); Hollander v. Pan
Am. World Airways, Inc., 382 F. Supp. 96, 101-02 (D. Md. 1973) (use of unnecessarily abusive language, or other circumstances that would support a conclusion that the defendant acted in an ill-tempered manner or was motivated by ill will); Jiminez v. Maritime Overseas
Corp., 360 F. Supp. 142, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) ("gross disregard" for rights of injured party);
Brewster v. Boston Herald-Traveler Corp., 188 F. Supp. 565, 569 (D. Mass. 1960) ("disinterested malevolence" or "senseless spite" and "desire to inflict pain ... for the sake of making
somebody else squirm"); Rollenghager v. City of Orange, 116 Cal. App. 3d 414, 422-23, 172
Cal. Rptr. 49, 53-54 (1981) (hatred or ill will toward plaintiff).
135. See Smolla, Author Beware, supra note 45, at 78-81.
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B. Alternatives to the Privilege System
(1) Ordinary Negligence

Replacing the qualified privilege system with a judicially mandated
negligence standard of liability is the simplest method to protect the employer without unduly burdening the plaintiff or confusing the jury with
malice requirements. Adopting an ordinary negligence requirement in
all defamation cases would abrogate the qualified privilege in many instances. For example, a uniform negligence requirement makes the qualified privilege obsolete when the state maintains that lack of due care
forecloses the privilege. 36 In this situation, the negligence requirement
absorbs the privilege rules.
Some states, however, may adopt a dual system of defamation that
requires negligence to establish liability and some form of malice to overcome the qualified privilege. 37 Under this system, once the plaintiff
demonstrates all the elements of defamation, including negligence, he
must overcome the privilege. The state may require the plaintiff to show
actual malice, common-law malice, or both to foreclose the privilege. 38
Requiring the plaintiff to demonstrate negligence and to overcome
the privilege with a showing of malice, however, places too great a burden on the defamed employee. For example, if state law requires actual
malice to overcome the qualified privilege, the employer who negligently
provides a false reference or false termination reason is protected unless
the employee can demonstrate the higher degree of intent. Clearly, employers' free speech interests are protected in this instance. Yet, the
plaintiff subsidizes this interest as the uncompensated victim of a defamatory statement, even though the employer failed to use due care. This
result is unfair and unwarranted since the employer is at fault in this
136. Jacron Sales Co., Inc. v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 600, 350 A.2d 688, 699-700 (1976).
The Maryland Court of Appeals held that constitutional and state common-law defamation
required negligence on the part of media and nonmedia defendants. Id. at 594, 350 A.2d at
696. The court noted that adoption of the negligence standard obviated the need for the privilege if negligence alone could defeat the privilege. As a result, the state adopted an actual
malice standard, similar to that in New York Times, to overcome the qualified privilege. Id. at
600, 350 A.2d at 699.
As one commentator noted:
A state may choose a due care standard satisfying Gertz and apply this to all defamations whether qualifiedly privileged or not. This due care standard would absorb the
common law privileges and there would not be a distinction made between qualifiedly privileged and unprivileged communications. All private plaintiffs would have
to show the same level of lack of due care to sustain a claim for defamation.
Comment, The Constitutional Fault Test of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and the Continued
Viability of the Common Law Privileges in the Law of Defamation, 20 ARIz. L. REV. 799, 820
(1978) (authored by Richard L. Barnes).
137. Jacron Sales, 276 Md. at 598, 350 A.2d at 699; Comment, supra note 136, at 820.
138. Comment, supra note 136, at 820; see also Watkins & Schwartz, supra note 11, at 881
(listing the alternative effects the Gertz fault requirement can have on state privilege laws).
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situation. First amendment considerations do not condone free speech at
139
all costs.
Alternatively, states may require common-law malice in order to
overcome the privilege. In this situation, the plaintiff must show negligence in addition to demonstrating the employer's ill will or spite. This
method creates a two-tiered test that forces the jury to look first at due
care, then at motive. All of the problems inherent in the common-law
malice standard, such as the ambiguity of the terms "ill will" or "spite"
and the subjective nature of malice, in addition to the extra burden
of
4°
proving negligence, make this option awkward and difficult.1
Application of a negligence standard of liability and repeal of the
privilege system provide a better alternative. This alternative not only
insures minimum protection for the innocent employer without foreclosing recovery when fault exists, but also simplifies defamation cases by
eliminating the confusing malice requirements. Repeal of the qualified
privilege protections alone, however, could adversely affect already chilled workplace communications by decreasing employer protections in
some instances. Employers who were accustomed to an actual malice or
common-law malice standard will find an ordinary negligence standard
an unwelcome change.
(2) The EnhancedNegligence Standard
Anderson's enhanced or constitutional definition of negligence
presents an alternative to both ordinary negligence and the actual malice
requirement. The enhanced negligence standard is superior to both standards because it increases employer protection without subjecting the
employee to the rigors of proving knowing or reckless disregard for the
truth. Instead, the employee must demonstrate the employer's failure to
exercise reasonable professional care by clear and convincing proof.
While more exacting than ordinary negligence, the enhanced liability
standard does not approach the difficulty of demonstrating actual malice.
The constitutional definition of negligence creates a middle ground that
protects the employer from the chilling effects of strict liability while
concurrently relieving the employee of the travails of the privilege
system.
Despite ample reasons to replace the antiquated privilege system
with a negligence standard of liability, Stuempges v. ParkeDavis & Co. 14 ,
demonstrated one potential drawback to this proposed reform. In
Stuempges, the employer gave a reasonable, though highly opinionated
139. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 503 (1951) (although free discourse inherently
is valuable, occasionally it is subordinate to other societal values).
140. Watkins & Schwartz, supra note 11, at 879-83.
141. 297 N.W.2d 252 (Minn. 1980).
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and unenthusiastic, reference for the employee plaintiff.1 42 In a subsequent defamation action, the plaintiff defeated the employer's privilege
pursuant to the common-law definition of malice. The court reasoned
that it was "important to protect the job seeker from malicious undercutting by a former employer. In this context the state of mind of the utsignificant than whether he knew
terer of the alleged defamation is more
14 3
that what he was saying was false."'
Under a negligence standard of liability, however, the employer in
Stuempges could have escaped liability since motive and intent are absent
from a due care analysis. To ensure adequate protection of the employee,
the Stuempges court rejected the negligence standard of liability and concluded that the common-law malice requirement should be applied in
employment defamation cases.' 44
This conclusion, however, can be rebutted. First, since bias in favor
of defamation plaintiffs frequently influences the jury's determination of
fault,145 common-law malice is a poor indicator of the defendant's intent
to defame. In other words, the common-law malice requirement is
highly susceptible to mistake and jury bias, given that juries tend to
equate false statements with the speaker's intent. 146 While this also may
be true with a negligence standard, the Anderson definition resolves some
of the dangers of unsubstantiated jury determinations regarding negligence. The clear and convincing evidence test and independent appellate
review of the jury verdict insure that the plaintiff establishes a compelling
case of lack of due care, and that the jury is not merely equating the false
statement with the failure of the speaker to act reasonably.
Second, the Stuempges court failed to recognize that an employer's
dislike of an employee does not necessarily color the employer's speech.
In other words, there may be a tendency for juries to equate animosity
between the employer and the employee with the speech at issue when, in
fact, the employer's personal feelings about the employee are unrelated to
the decision to dismiss that employee. Again, the common-law malice
requirement unjustly skews verdicts in favor of the plaintiff. Any evidence of personality conflict between the employee and the employer becomes evidence of improper motive to terminate regardless of the actual
142.
143.
144.

Id. at 255.
Id. at 258.
Id.

145. See sources cited supra note 13 (demonstrating jury bias); see also Franklin, Declaratory Judgment, supra note 12, at 823 (A "negligence standard brings strict liability back into
the libel area through the back door because it is simply too easy for plaintiffs to prove. It is a
small jump from finding an error to concluding that someone in the operation behaved
unreasonably ... ").
146. Bezanson, supra note 11, at 230-32; Franklin, DeclaratoryJudgment, supra note 12,
at 823.
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nexus between the dismissal and the employer's attitude towards that
employee.
Finally, the negligence standard potentially covers speech motivated
by ill will in that it is unreasonable for an employer to give a bad reference or to state a false reason for termination based on personal feelings.
Thus, the negligence standard of liability could subsume the commonlaw malice requirement.
In conclusion, adoption of a negligence standard of liability would
extinguish the need for the qualified privilege system. It would simplify
and unify defamation law by eliminating the problems that have resulted
from multiple definitions of malice. Lost protection under the qualified
privilege, however, may further inhibit free expression. Adoption of Anderson's constitutional definition of negligence-which tailors ordinary
negligence to professional conduct and requires procedural safeguards
that insure the sufficiency of the evidence and the integrity of the jury
verdicts-provides the optimal alternative in a defamation case for both
the employers and employees.
While the Anderson model enhances the employer's first amendment protections, it may foreclose recovery when an employee is legitimately defamed. The defamed employee who cannot prove the requisite
level of fault would be denied a remedy no matter how severe the injury
to reputation or livelihood. 147 The following section of this Note reviews
remedies available to defamation plaintiffs to assess how this gap might
be filled and recommends the elimination of punitive damages and the
establishment of a declaratory relief option to provide redress for plaintiff's who may be denied recovery under the Anderson model.
IV.

A.

Reforming Remedies: Eliminating Punitive Damages and
Providing a Declaratory Relief Alternative in
Employer Defamation Cases

Eliminating Punitive Damages

The attractiveness of high damage awards is a motivating force behind many defamation suits. 148 As Professor Franklin concludes,
147.

See R.

SMOLLA,

supra note 1, at 3-13 to 3-14 (discussing why a negligence standard

would be a substantial impediment to defamation victims).
148. Recent studies by the Libel Defense Resource Center (LDRC), a New York based
information clearinghouse organized by media groups to monitor developments in libel law,
reveal a tremendous increase in the amount of damages awarded, though many were later
reduced or reversed on appeal. LDRC Bull. No. 7, July 15, 1983, at 5; LDRC Bull. No. 4,

Oct. 15, 1982, at 3-4; see also Smolla, Author Beware, supra note 45, at 1-10 (describing the
"dramatic proliferation of highly publicized libel actions" and the "reinvigoration of the modem law of defamation"). But see Soloski, The Study and the Libel Plaintiff. Who Sues for
Libel?, 71 IOWA L. REv. 217, 220 (1985) (study demonstrating that some defamation plaintiffs
only wish to clear their names).
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"[L]ibel law, particularly media libel law, has developed into a highstakes game that serves the purposes of neither the parties nor the pub' 149
lic."

Since the Gertz decision, juries have tended to award higher dam-

ages due to the emphasis on fault.150 Studies have shown that libel juries
no longer merely provide compensation to the victim, but "are imposing
punishment for the defendant's irresponsible conduct" in the form of

high damage awards. ' 5'
152
Furthermore, the media has sensationalized high jury verdicts,
indicating to prospective jurors that these exorbitant figures have "some
meaningful relation to damage deserving recompense. It is no wonder

that seven-figure libel verdicts are now almost the norm, and eight-figure
153
verdicts are not uncommon."'
Juries and the press are not the sole causes of high verdicts, as defamation itself has a built-in system that fosters abuse regarding damages.
The three components of this system are: (1) presumed actual damages
in private defamation cases; 154 (2) excessive and unwarranted punitive
awards; 155 and (3) the lack of an alternative remedy to divert damage
litigation and satisfy the plaintiff. 156
149.

Franklin, DeclaratoryJudgment, supra note 12, at 810.
150. Barrett, supra note 12, at 856.
151. Id.
152. Most press descriptions of libel suits include the ad damnum amount. See, e.g., CBS
-lit with $100-Million Suit over News Story, BROADCASTING, Mar. 10, 1986, at 73; Ex-Agent
Files $120 Million Libel Suit Against Publisher, PUBLISHER'S WEEKLY, Nov. 13, 1981, at 11;
Taylor, Cost of Libel Suits Prompts Calls to Alter System, N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1985, at Al1,
col. 1 (reference to Westmoreland's "$120 million suit" against CBS).
153. Barrett, supra note 12, at 856-57 (showing that there were 11 verdicts in excess of S1
million between 1982 and 1984) (citing LDRC Bull. No. 1, Nov. 15, 1984, at 15).
154. As noted in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974):
The largely uncontrolled discretion of juries to award damages where there is no loss
unnecessarily compounds the potential of any system of liability for defamatory falsehood to inhibit the vigorous exercise of First Amendment freedoms. Additionally,
the doctrine of presumed damages invites juries to punish unpopular opinion rather
than to compensate individuals for injury sustained by the publication of a false fact.
See also Franklin, Good Names, supra note 13, at 11 ("In no other area of tort law does the
jury lack guidelines in determining damages.").
155. See Barrett, supra note 12, at 851 (advocating elimination of punitive awards);
Ingber, supra note 9, at 834 (punitive damages result in overdeterrence). Other authorities
recommending abolition of punitive awards include: Franklin, Good Names, supra note 13, at
39 n.172; Smolla, Author Beware, supra note 45, at 91-92; Van Alstyne, First Amendment
Limitations on Recovery from the Press-An Extended Comment on "The Anderson Solution,"
25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 793, 803-09 (1984); see also Wheeler v. Green, 286 Or. 99, 119, 593
P.2d 777, 789 (1979) (punitive damages in defamation cases found to violate state constitution's protection for freedom of expression).
156. See Barrett, supra note 12, at 848-49 (advocating declaratory judgment as an alternative to damage actions in defamation cases); Franklin, DeclaratoryJudgment, supra note 12, at
809-12 (same).
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A brief background of defamation remedies places the above
problems in perspective. Recoverable damages in a defamation action
include: compensatory or actual damages, 157 punitive or exemplary
damages, 158 and nominal damages.' 59
Courts allowed plaintiffs to recover presumed actual damages under
16 0
common-law defamation actions, in lieu of proving actual damages.
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., however, held that presumed actual damages
were inconsistent with first amendment principles.' 6' The Court barred
presumed damages absent a showing of actual malice. 162 Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. restricted the Gertz holding regarding damages to statements of general or public concern.' 63 As a
result, private plaintiffs need not meet the Gertz standard of actual malice
to recover presumed damages unless the statement is of general or public
concern. ' Actual damages are presumed when the statement concerns
65
private affairs.'
Although presumed damages increases the potential for recovery absent injury, they are justified in the employer defamation case given the
difficulty of proving injury to one's reputation.' 66 There is no practical
way to measure damage to professional standing, loss of advantageous
157. Compensatory damages are either general or special damages. General damages are
those damages that are common or usual when a person is defamed, including all forms of
compensatory damages other than pecuniary loss. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 621
comment a (1977). General damages encompass actual damages, or those damages supported
by evidence. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350. General damages also include presumed damages, or
those damages presumptively in existence as a matter of law. These damages are awarded
without any proof that the defendant has been injured. Belli v. Orlando Daily Newspapers,
Inc., 389 F.2d 579, 581-82 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 825 (1968).
General damages are presumed in libel and slander per se. KEETON, supra note 9, at 843.
Slander, or a spoken falsehood, usually requires a showing of special, or out-of-pocket damages
to recover. Slander per se provides exceptions to this general rule when the statement: (1)
imputes criminal behavior to the plaintiff; (2) accuses the plaintiff of having a loathsome disease; (3) adversely reflects on the plaintiff's business or professional reputation; or (4) accuses
the plaintiff of sexual misconduct. Id. at 788. Libel, or written falsehood, usually does not
require a showing of special damages. When the libel requires extrinsic evidence to perceive
the defamation, however, special damages are necessary. This type of libel is called libel per
quod. Id.
Special damages are those damages that are proximately caused by the defamation. Id. at
844. Special damages would include out-of-pocket losses, such as lost wages or medical bills.
Lind v. O'Reilly, 636 P.2d 1319, 1321 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 575 comment b (1977).
158. KEETON, supra note 9, at 842.
159. Id. at 854, 860.
160. Id. at 843.
161. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349.
162. Id.
163. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 759 (1985).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. See id. at 760.
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relationships, or pride. 167 The jury's function in determining the amount
of presumed damages that adequately compensates the plaintiff for loss
of reputation is invaluable. Juries should be able to reasonably estimate
the presumed damage award by drawing upon their own life experiences
168
and evaluating the facts of the case.
Punitive damages, however, cannot be justified by the same rationale
because they are awarded when the defendant publishes with an improper motive, or with knowledge of or reckless disregard for the truth of
the statement. 169 Thus, punitive awards do not fall within the legitimate
state interest of protecting individuals from, and compensating them for,
injury caused by careless or malicious speech. 170 Admittedly, the state
does have an interest in deterring false or malicious statements, but this
interest is far outweighed by the need to prevent censored expression.
Balancing the state interest in deterring false speech through the use
of punitive damages against the national commitment to free speech favors elimination of punitive damages for three reasons. First, juries have
broad discretion in awarding presumed damages. Thus, the state's deterrent function can be maintained to some extent without resorting to punitive damage awards. 17 1 Large presumed damage awards provide
incentive to speak with reasonable care.
Second, punitive awards increase the possibility of enormous, unregulated damage judgments that threaten free expression. 172 Punitive dam167. KEETON, supra note 9, at 843.
168. Shauer, The Role of the People in First Amendment Theory, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 761
(1986). Shauer reevaluates current distrust of juries in defamation cases and asserts that blind
acceptance of the idea that jury verdicts represent "tyranny of the majority" is overreactive.
Id. at 768-69. Shauer contends that "by removing majorities from any meaningful input into
the consideration of free speech issues, we run the risk that those majorities will cease to see
free speech as something they ought to care about." Id. at 783. Thus, Shauer asserts that "we
ought to pay more attention to juries and majorities" and their assessments of what speech
should or should not be protected. Id.
169. See, e.g., Burnett v. National Enquirer, Inc., 144 Cal. App. 3d 991, 1008, 193 Cal.
Rptr. 206, 216-17 (1983) (punitive damages decided on common-law malice of evil motive);
Bindrim v. Mitchell, 92 Cal. App. 3d 61, 74-75, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29, 36-37, cert. denied, 444 U.S.
984 (1979) (punitive damages decided on actual malice standard), disapproved on procedural
grounds, McCoy v. Hearst Corp., 42 Cal. 3d 835, 727 P.2d 711, 231 Cal. Rptr. 518 (1986)
(court disapproved of Bindrim's suggestion that an appellate court's duty to examine the record in a public official defamation case did not involve a de novo review of the actual malice
determination).
170. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 799 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Punitive damages in
particular [are] 'wholly irrelevant to the state interest' because '[tihey are not compensation for
injury.' ") (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974) (Harlan, J., concurring)) (emphasis in original).
171. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349.
172. See supra notes 148-53 and accompanying text. The typical damage award is now in
the millions of dollars. LDRC Bull. No. 7, July 15, 1983, at 58. Another study showed that
30 out of 47 defamation awards included punitive damages, and 7 of those punitive awards
were for $I million or more. LDRC Bull. No. 4, Oct. 15, 1982, at 3, 5, tables 2, 2-B at 6. More
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ages are more likely to contribute to excessive awards because unlike
presumed damages, which are related to the perceived loss, punitive
there is little guidamages lack an adequate measuring standard. Thus,
173
dance to aid juries in determining punitive awards.
Moreover, because punitive awards are unrelated to compensating
the plaintiff, they are subject to greater abuse. In determining the size of
punitive awards, juries are likely to be influenced by their outrage at the
content of the speech, rather than the motive of the speaker. This tends
to make unpopular speech subject to higher judgments. 174 Thus, punitive awards will tend to punish the type of expression rather than the
defendant. For example, a mistaken reference may be neither intentional
nor motivated by ill will. The jury's outrage at the employee's misfortune, however, may color their finding of malice. Thus, an employer
may be punished for his speech rather than for any intent to harm the
employee.
Finally, jury determination of punitive awards is complicated by the
need to define and apply the correct standard of malice. As previously
stated, juries sympathize with defamation plaintiffs 175 in awarding punitive damages, and tend to find scienter when none exists. 76 The jury's
tendency to equate false statements with the intent or malice of the
speaker augments the probability of unreasonably high punitive awards.
Increased punitive damages pose a serious threat to workplace communications given that the plaintiff already has been compensated, perhaps
generously, under the presumed damage category. 17 7 Furthermore, the
punitive damage award is generally uninsurable, 78 thus enhancing the
plaintiff's settlement advantage and threatening to put an employer of
modest means out of business.
In sum, punitive damages should be eliminated in private defamation actions due to the lack of a legitimate state interest in awarding punitive damage awards; the notion that plaintiffs already are compensated
adequately under the presumed category; the chilling effect of potentially
large punitive awards; and the tendency of juries to equate the false statement with malice, thus increasing the probability for abusive use of punitive damages.
recent LDRC reports indicate that punitive damages are averaging $8 million per award.
LDRC Special Alert, July 29, 1983, at 1.
173. See Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 779.
174. See supra notes 151-53 and accompanying text.
175. See sources cited Ikpra note 13.
176. See sources cited supra note 145.
177. See Wheeler v. Green, 286 Or. 99, 119, 593 P.2d 777, 789 (1979) (Underscoring the
court's disallowance of punitive damages is the idea that the plaintiff already receives compensation under the presumed category. The additional punitive damages do not enhance compensation but do stifle free speech.).
178. Barrett, supra note 12, at 858-60.
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B. Declaratory Relief as an Alternative Remedy in Defamation Cases
While some plaintiffs desire monetary relief, others want only a
chance to vindicate their reputations. 179 In these cases, declaratory relief
is an effective alternative to damages. Professors Barrett and Franklin
both contend that legislative adoption of a declaratory judgment remedy
provides one solution to the libel crisis. 180 The remainder of this section
briefly reviews their proposals and summarizes how the declaratory relief
alternative would work in employer defamation actions.
The professors' proposals share common features. A declaratory relief provision would allow either plaintiff or defendant to initiate an action in which the defendant's state of mind is not at issue. 18 1 In essence,
the declaratory judgment would focus on the falsity requirement without
having to prove or disprove intent. 18 2 Both proposals would preclude the
plaintiff from recovering damages or asserting any other claim arising
out of the same statement once the declaratory action is filed. 183 Finally,
the declaratory relief rule would provide for fee shifting whereby the los84
ing party in the action would pay the winner's attorney's fees. 1
These features of the declaratory relief provision make it a useful
remedy in the employer defamation scenario. As previously stated,
adoption of either an ordinary tort negligence or Anderson's constitutional definition of negligence forecloses relief to the employee who is
injured by the employer's false statement but cannot establish the requisite fault. 185 Declaratory relief enables the employee to obtain a
favorable judgment in order to clear his name without having to establish
the employer's fault-which can be time consuming and difficult to
prove. Thus, elimination of the fault requirement can save the employee
time and money. Furthermore, the attorney's fees provision "make[s]
the declaratory judgment a feasible remedy for plaintiffs who are not
86
wealthy."
From the employer's perspective, the declaratory judgment insures
that a suit for money damages will not be initiated once the declaratory
action is filed. Damage actions will become less threatening as declaratory relief becomes an efficient and popular alternative. In addition, the
employer's ability to initiate the declaratory action will discourage frivo179.
180.
181.
182.
815-16.
183.
35.
184.
832-35.
185.
186.

See Soloski, supra note 148, at 220 (summary of an Iowa study of 164 libel plaintiffs).
Barrett, supra note 12, at 847; Franklin, Declaratory Judgment, supra note 12, at 810.
Barrett, supra note 12, at 849; Franklin, Declaratory Judgment, supra note 12, at 812.
Barrett, supra note 12, at 855-56; Franklin, Declaratory Judgment, supra note 12, at
Barrett, supra note 12, at 851; Franklin, DeclaratoryJudgment, supra note 12, at 832Barrett, supra note 12, at 850-51; Franklin, DeclaratoryJudgment, supra note 12, at
See supra notes 141-47 and accompanying text.
Barrett, supra note 12, at 851.
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lous suits.
Meritless claimants will end up with large attorney's fees
based on the fee shifting provision. Finally, forced settlements will be
less threatening to employers. The employer of modest means will not
feel compelled to settle for fear of expensive litigation. If the employee
fails to establish the falsity of the statement, the employer can initiate the
thereby avoiding the settlement and obtaining reimdeclaratory action, 188
bursement for fees.
Although the provision foreclosing a suit for money damages when
the employer files for a declaratory judgment limits frivolous suits, it also
poses problems. Should the court rule against the employer, the employee would be precluded from initiating a suit for money damages even
if the employee can demonstrate the requisite fault. Thus, declaratory
relief may become a method for employers to avoid financial liability.
One remedy for this problem would be to limit the rule precluding
subsequent lawsuits to the plaintiff. Thus, further litigation against the
employer would be barred only if the employee brings the declaratory
action. Another option would be to allow a second suit for damages only
if the employee could demonstrate a substantial likelihood of fault on the
part of the employer. Neither option would be available to the employee
who lost the declaratory judgment since the element of falsity would be
lacking in the defamation action. With these modifications, declaratory
relief provides an efficient and attractive alternative to damage awards
and promises to decrease the threat of frivolous suits and excessive damage awards.
Approaching employer defamation cases from a damage perspective
could prove to be as effective as reforming liability requirements.18 9
Fewer sensational damage awards will diminish the threat to the employer that currently is posed by defamation suits. Decreasing fear of
litigation costs and high damage awards will curb reactionary measures
to the defamation trend, such as no reference policies. Elimination of
punitive awards will reduce the stakes for defamation plaintiffs as well.
Thus, plaintiffs will have less incentive to litigate claims on the basis of
windfall damage judgments.
Declaratory relief provides an alternative remedy for employees who
are more concerned with clearing their name than with obtaining large
damage awards. It also provides an effective remedy for those who want
to avoid more costly litigation that requires a demonstration of fault, and
for those who cannot establish the requisite fault but nevertheless have
been defamed. Increasing popularity of declaratory judgment as a
187. Franklin, DeclaratoryJudgment, supra note 12, at 814-15.
188. Barrett, supra note 12, at 859-60.
189. See Ingber, supra note 9, at 825-32 (suggesting that attempts to reduce the chilling
effect of defamation by altering liability requirements have failed miserably and that approaching the problem by reforming remedies poses a superior option).
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method of resolving employer defamation disputes will de-emphasize
large damage awards and costly litigation associated with defamation.
The ultimate effect of reducing damage litigation will be to mitigate employer fear and to re-open workplace communications.
Conclusion
Fear of liability has caused many employers to refrain from giving
references or reasons for terminating employees. Increasing defamation
litigation aggravates employer fear and unnecessarily chills work-related
speech. Inadequacies in employer protection under constitutional and
tort law, unrestricted punitive awards, and the lack of a declaratory relief
alternative all exacerbate the threat to free expression in the workplace.
To remedy these inadequacies, in employer defamation cases an enhanced definition of negligence should be applied, the qualified privilege
and punitive damages should be eliminated, and declaratory relief statutes should be adopted. An enhanced or constitutional definition of negligence would require courts to evaluate negligence according to the
standards of the professional community rather than the ordinary person. The enhanced negligence standard also would require plaintiffs to
prove negligence by clear and convincing evidence and would allow for
independent review of jury verdicts.
Adoption of an enhanced negligence standard in all employer defamation cases would reduce employer fear of strict liability, create a uniform standard upon which employers could pattern their speech and
conduct, and insure that liability was established clearly through the use
of the higher degree of proof and independent review procedures. Replacement of the qualified privilege system with the enhanced negligence
standard also would benefit employees by eliminating the more stringent
malice requirement.
Elimination of punitive awards would decrease the threat of immense and uninsurable damage judgments while the adoption of declaratory relief statutes would provide an efficient and less costly method of
resolving defamation disputes. Finally, declaratory relief resolves some
of the inequities of a negligence standard by providing relief for employees who cannot prove the requisite fault.
The above proposals suggest several ways to curb the fear engendered by the employer defamation trend. The proposals provide unified
and simplified rules that strive to balance the separate interests of employers and employees. The result will be to decrease the fear of liability
that has stifled employer references and has inhibited free expression in
the workplace.

